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ABSTRACT
Even with all the advances we have seen in secure digital
technology, the most secure way to currently cast a vote on
election day consist of a hand-marked paper ballot. When
extenuating circumstances arise, offering a voting environment that is accessible and safe for everyone, but also secure
can be a difficult task under the current voting system. This
paper discusses one proposed electronic voting system which
uses blockchain technology. Based on a review of literature
on blockchain technology and specific implementations of
voting systems, a summary of relevant background information as well as implementation protocol are provided. Even
though experts believe that societies are not currently ready
to implement systems like the one described in this paper,
the technology to create a secure and efficient system does
exist, and could one day become available.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Voting in local and national elections mark one of the few
chances the typical member of society has to express their
democratic right and personal views. In the most recent national election (2020), 69.9% of registered voters were living
in jurisdictions that use hand-marked paper ballots for the
majority of voters [8]. This method of voting is used because
it is able to offer verifiability, uniqueness, and security. [3].
These properties are invaluable, and without them, a voting system can not succeed. At the same time, there are
challenges that may, and often do arise at a national, regional, and individual level that deem hand-marked paper
ballots as inaccessible, unusable, or inefficient. These challenges broach the subject of an electronic voting system (evoting).
With this challenge in mind, Stefano Bistarelli, Ivan Mercanti, Paolo Santancini, and Francesco Santin proposed an
e-voting system that leverages technology currently being
utilized for Bitcoin [3]. The researchers describe an innovative implementation of a potential system with more decentralization, and accessibility than the current voting system
is able to offer. More importantly though, the proposed votThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. To view a copy of
this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.
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ing system meets the same security, integrity, and verifiability properties that validate the hand-marked paper ballot
system [3].
The proposed implementation is entirely based on existing blockchain technology as implemented by Bitcoin. Verified voters are each given their own virtual wallet. The
researchers use the term wallet to refer to an individual’s
voting wallet on their personal computer, or a web portal
which assists with the vote casting processes. The wallet
is part of the web application they call ‘Coin Prism’ [3].
This implementation offers verifiability and security from
the point of candidate nomination to the release of election
results.
The results of the proposed blockchain system were promising. The researchers were able to effectively meet all the
standards of a functional voting system. The implications
of this proposed technology could increase voter turnout by
making voting more accessible to those who may not be able
to vote in person, or even just easier for those who would
prefer not to vote in person [7]. The decentralized nature of
the blockchain could also offer efficient and accurate audits
and recounts.
In this paper, I first introduce some background information about a few major relevant cryptographic concepts.
I will then introduce, and discuss the aforementioned electronic voting system in 3 phases. Section 3.1 will discuss the
pre-voting phase, section 3.2 will discuss the voting phase,
and section 3.3 will cover the post-voting phase.

2. BACKGROUND
There are a few major requirements that are expected to
be met by any successful voting system. This section will
briefly define those requirements in the context of electronic
voting. Furthermore, this section includes a bit of information about what our current voting systems do to meet those
requirements.

2.1 Verifiability
In this context, verifiability means that there must be a
practical way to verify that all votes have been accurately
accounted for and correctly counted. This also means there
must be a reliable collection of election records that include
details about the authentication and voting process. Paper voting systems meet these requirements easily, as all the
votes are physically stored, and available to refer back to
should the need arise. Meeting the requirements of verifiability also means that records must be accessible, and usable
in the case of an audit. For paper voting systems, this prop-
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Figure 1: Secure Hash Function In Action [2]
Figure 2: Asymmetric Cryptography [4]
erty is sometimes fulfilled with the help of poll workers who
use either paper records, or electronic poll-books. These poll
books are a computer-based system that poll workers use
to look up registered voters in order to either check them
in, verify the person’s identity, or verify that the person is
ineligible to vote. [8].

2.2 Uniqueness
Assuring that no individual can vote more than once is
essential to an honest and democratic election. Electronic
poll-books (see section 2.1) help to ensure uniqueness in the
voting systems implemented today. [8]. Once an individual
has cast a vote, the poll worker will update the voter’s registration file to record that a vote has been cast. Any vote
received by this same individual after this point will be denied. The same goes for those who mail in a vote as well
as voting in person on the day of the election. Strict rules
about voter registration also help to ensure that each person
may only cast one vote.

2.3 Security
Furthermore, there must be a way to verify that each vote
has not been tampered with at any point in the process. In
paper voting systems, this property is achievable through the
guidelines placed on the marking of ballots. These guidelines
include things such as the nullification of ballots which contain improperly or ambiguously marked information. Mindful and secure storage practices of the paper records and poll
books are also used to prevent manipulation of voter data.
Another important part of voting security is the anonymity
of voters. In order to avoid bias or coercion, it is crucial that
a vote cannot be linked to the individual that cast it.

2.4 Cryptographically Secure Hash
Cryptographic hash functions are mathematical algorithms
that map data of arbitrary size to a bit array of a fixed size.
The bit array that results from a hash function may be referred to as the hash value. Hash functions are quickly computable, and impossible to invert. This means that there
is no way in which the output of a hash function can be
used to derive the input, such functions are referred to as
one-way functions. Secure hash algorithms can be used to
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verify that the contents of a message have not been altered,
note however this is different than encryption, as the function cannot be reversed. A simple example of this concept
in practice may go something like this: Alice (a fictional
character commonly used as a placeholder when discussing
cryptographic systems and protocols) [2] wants to send a
message through a public network, but when the message
reaches its destination, Alice wants a way of knowing that
her message has not been altered. In order to check the
integrity of her message, Alice can create a hash of her message before sending, and after sending. If Alice compares
these hashes and finds them to be the same, she will know
the message is unchanged. This hash is essentially a unique
ID for Alice’s message, similar to a finger print, as it is very
nearly impossible for two messages to yield the same hash
value. Even the smallest change in a message, will result in
a completely different hash, with no relation to the hash of
the unchanged message.

2.5 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography, also referred to as public-key
cryptography, is a cryptographic system that utilizes a pair
of keys for each participant. In cryptography, a key refers
to a group of characters in a particular order. These keys
are used to specify the alteration of data so that it may be
scrambled, or disguised such that anyone without the key
will be mathematically unable to read the information. Keys
are not intended to be read or remembered by humans, so
most keys have low human readability. One of these keys is
considered the private key and should be kept a secret. The
second is a public key and should be made available publicly.
A message that is encrypted using a public key, may only
be decrypted with the corresponding private key. In the
same vein, a message which is encrypted using a private key,
may only be decrypted using the corresponding public key.
This means that any individual has the ability to encrypt a
message using their intended recipient’s public key. When
this encrypted message is sent, the sender knows only the
owner of the corresponding private key will be able to read
the message, and the wrong people will not (see Figure 2).
The security of asymmetric cryptography relies on the pri-
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Figure 3: Since 1 is the greatest common divisor, these numbers are co-prime

secret. Large in this context means numbers with hundreds
of digits. p and q are chosen randomly within a set of guidelines. After this calculation, n can be computed, as n = pq.
This n will be used as a modulus for the key pairs later
on. The next step involves calculating φ(n), Euler’s Totient
Function, as described above in section 2.6.2. Since we calculated earlier that n = pq, we can say φ(n) = (p−1)×(q−1)
this is possible because p and q are both prime numbers, and
because Euler’s phi function is multiplicative when the factors are relatively prime. This means that φ(ab) = φ(a)φ(b).
Finally, e,public key exponent, and d, the private key exponent can be determined. e is chosen with the restriction that
it must be within the range (1, φ(n)), and e and φ(n) must
be co-prime. d is simply calculated as follows: e × d = 1
mod φ(n), this d is kept private along with p and q, while e
and n are public. It is important to note that without knowing p and q, it is impossible to find d, even with knowledge
of e and n.

2.6.4
vate key remaining private, and the public key being public
knowledge. Keys can be generated in a number of different
ways based on the algorithm being used, but the generation always involves the use of one-way functions (meaning
functions which cannot be reversed).

2.6 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a cryptographically secure mathematical scheme which employs asymmetric cryptography
(see section 2.2) to verify the authenticity of digital documents and messages. This means that the receiver of the
message is able to ensure that the message is from the person they expected it to be from and also that the message
has not been changed anywhere in the process.

2.6.1 RSA Digital Signatures
One example of a digital signature scheme would be RSA
digital signatures. The letters in RSA represent the initials
of the three developers responsible for the algorithm, Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman. RSA digital signatures makes use of
the RSA Algorithm, one of the more popular digital signature schemes [4]. There are other algorithms that may be
used for completing digital signatures, but RSA is relatively
straightforward, and for this reason, will be used to describe
digital signatures in this paper.

2.6.2 Euler’s Totient Function
Euler’s Totient Function, denoted as φ(n) counts the positive integers, up to integer n that are co-prime (also called
relatively prime) to n. Two integers a and b are called coprime if 1 is the greatest common divisor for a and b. (15, 8)
is an example of a co-prime integer pair, whereas (10, 15)
would not be a co-prime integer pair, because they are each
dividable by 5 (see Figure 3). For further example, φ(6) = 2,
because in {1, 2, 3...6}, {1, 5}(a total of 2 numbers) are coprime to 6. An important property of Euler’s Totient Function is that φ(p) = p − 1 where p is any prime number. This
property will be leveraged in the digital signature process.

2.6.3

RSA Key Generation

The RSA digital signature scheme begins with the generation of a key pair. Key generation works as follows: two
distinct large prime numbers p, and q are chosen, and kept
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Signing a Message

With the keys generated, a message can now be signed. If
Alice wants to send a signed message to Bob, she must first
produce a hash value of her intended message, and raise it
to the power of d, (the private exponent). She then attaches
this hash value raised by the private exponent to her message
as a signature. The intention of a digital signature is not to
disguise the contents of the message, but rather to confirm
the source. Once Bob receives the signed message, he will
raise the signature to the power of e (the public exponent).
The reason he does this is to leverage the following equation:
hde = h (mod n). Raising the hash value to the power of
both the exponents yields the original hash value. With
this, Bob can now compare the signature to the hash value
of Alice’s message, if the two match, he can confirm that the
signature is valid and that the message came from Alice.

2.6.5

Blind Signatures

A blind signature is a special form of a digital signature, which disguises the contents of a message from the
signer. This allows signing authorities to authorize digital
documents without being aware of the contents of the message. Before a message is sent to the signer, the message
is blinded, meaning the content is hidden in a way that can
not be recognized by the signer. A real-world analogy to
this procedure would be handing a completed ballot to a
voting official in a sealed carbon paper envelope which has
the voter’s credentials written on the front. The official signs
the ballot through the envelope via the carbon paper and the
voter is now free to cast their ballot how they choose, and
the authenticity may be verified via the official’s signature.
[4]
One way blind signatures may be implemented is with
RSA blind signatures. This process begins with the Alice
multiplying the message m by what is called a blinding factor. The blinding factor is a random number r raised to the
power of e, similar to the digital signature procedure discussed in section 3.1.3. Alice then sends this blinded message (m0 , where m0 = mre ) to a signing authority. Because
the blinding factor is both random and very large, the signing authority will have no way of reading the message they
are signing. After adding a digital signature, the blinded and
singed message s0 is sent back to Alice as s0 = (m0 )d . Alice
now needs to unblind the message. To remove the blinding
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factor, Alice can multiply the blind signature by the inverse
of the random integer r.
s = s0 ∗ r−1
= md ∗ red ∗ r−1
= md ∗ r ∗ r−1
= md
This leaves Alice with a valid digital signature on her original
unblinded message

3. BLOCKCHAIN/BITCOIN
Blockchain is a chain of digital blocks that can hold information. This framework was originally created to implement and utilize digital timestamps for important documents to prevent tampering. Now though, it is the basis
of the popular digital crypto-currency Bitcoin. More specifically a blockchain is a distributed ledger or a special type
of database which is shared and replicated in a synchronized manner across all the members of a decentralized network [6]. Unlike many other databases, once a piece of data
is added to the blockchain, it is very difficult to remove.
Each individual block contains data, the hash of the block,
and the hash of the previous block. These hashes, as described in section 2.1, are like a unique finger print that
depends on the entire contents of the block, including transaction details in the case of Bitcoin. Storing the previous block’s hash acts as a security measure to protect the
blockchain from undetected changes. If a block is compromised or manipulated, the hash of that block will immediately change, and as a result, it will not match the hash that
is stored in the subsequent block. This makes manipulation
of a block chain extremely difficult, in order to manipulate
one block in a chain undetected, you would have to alter
every other block that follows it.

3.1 Proof-of-work
Proof-of-work is a piece of data that is difficult to produce, but easy to verify, and is the mechanism which slows
down the creation of new blocks. For Bitcoin, the proof-ofwork aims to make the work of ‘mining’ (adding a block to
the blockchain through valid hash generation) very energyintensive, and somewhat time-consuming. In order for a new
block to be accepted into the network of participants, the
miner must create a block in which the hash of the block’s
header is lower than or equal to the current target. This
target is a 256-bit number (a very large number) that all
Bitcoin clients share. While the target number is large, it is
only a very small percentage of the total options of possible
numbers. The difficulty of the proof-of-work can be adjusted
by lowering, or raising the target number. Bitcoin adjusts
the difficulty to limit the rate of new block generation to one
per every ten minutes [1].

3.2 P2P Networks
Peer-to-peer network P 2P is a decentralized network communication model that consists of many devices (or nodes).
Each of the nodes collectively stores and shares files without
any sort of centralized server or administration. This allows
for a network where no single node is more powerful than
any other node. In terms of blockchain architecture, this
property allows for anyone to participate in the process of
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Figure 4: Chain Diagram
verifying and validating a new node. The transactions of the
blockchain are stored on each node of the network, and together these devices are able to reach and keep a consensus
on the accuracy of the data at all times. This also means
greater security and stability should one of the nodes crash
or go down. There are plenty of other nodes available, thus
no one is able to take down the blockchain in this manner.

4. USING BITCOIN BLOCKCHAIN FOR EVOTING
The researchers behind the following E-voting implementation decided that the process would be best organized by
dividing it into three stages, pre-voting, voting, and the
counting phase. Each of these stages works together to
create a voting system that meets all the requirements as
discussed in section 2.

4.1 Pre-voting Phase
4.1.1 Candidate Nomination
The first set of the pre-voting phase consists of voter registration. It is recommended that this process remains quite
similar to the process that is required of voters now. At the
time of voter registration, a system in which candidates can
be nominated is created and implemented. Furthermore,
there must be a means for the candidates to be eligible to
receive votes. As for this implementation, the researchers
decided that each candidate is given a part of asymmetric
keys, one of which being public, and the remaining key is
private. The candidate’s public key is made available to all
voters. For security, and to reduce that chance of manipulation, these keys would not be available on a government
web page, but rather they would be provided to the voter
at the time of voting.

4.1.2 Voter Authentication
The blind signature protocol, (as described in section 2.6.5)
in this case takes place between the Authentication Server
(AS), and the voter. The Authentication Server is responsible solely for authenticating the identity of a voter, and
nothing else. The voter will be required to provide a form
of official identification, likely an ID, or another document
of this nature. Along with this identifying information, the
voter will send their blinded public key to the Authentication Server for signing. The Authentication Service will
receive the blinded public key along with the information
proving the voter is who they claim to be. For the sake of
voter anonymity, it is very important that this process is
be completed via a blind signature. This means that the
Authentication Server will have no way of connecting the
voter’s public key, to their physical identity, and thus have
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Figure 6: Visual Representation of Voting Phase [3]

Figure 5: Visual Representation of Pre-Voting Phase [3]
no way of connecting a vote to a specific individual. Immediately following the blind signing, the signed key is returned
back to the voter, who can unblind the key and the signature. With this, the voter has a signed and authenticated
public key.

4.1.3 Token Distribution
Token distribution is the second phase of the voter authentication process. The Token Distribution Server is a completely separate entity from the the Authentication Server.
This is an important strategic decision that helps to protect
voter identity. The role of the Token Distribution Server is
to distribute tokens to voter’s who have a public key which
has already been signed by the Authentication Server (Section 4.1.2). A voter will send their signed key unblinded to
the Token Distribution Server, who has no knowledge of the
voter’s identify. The server simply knows that their identity
has been authenticated, and that they are ready to receive
a voting token via their public key. This voting token is essentially like a coin with which a vote may be cast. To cast
their vote, a voter will transfer this coin to the candidate of
their choice.

4.2 Voting Phase
Once the voter has been authenticated, and the candidates have been nominated for candidacy, the voting phase
is ready to commence. This stage involved the preparation, and transfer of the voting token to the voter’s candidate/party of choice, and confirmation of the vote’s transmission. All of their operations can take place via the voter’s
wallet. Self-checking for the party/candidate’s revival of the
vote is as easy as checking to see if the transaction is present
in the blockchain. The vote may be cast by the user via a
simple web browser [3]. Through the web interface, the voter
chooses a candidate via a database and casts their vote via
their web-based wallet (the wallet is not presented to the
user directly, and rather this is hidden behind a more userfriendly transaction process). After their vote has been cast,
the voter is given a transaction ID. This ID is their receipt,
which they can use to check on the status of their vote.
Through this, they will be able to see if their vote has been
assigned as they intended.

4.3 Implementation
Now that Alice has her token, she may transfer her token to the candidate she likes using an online console. The
designers of the system offered up a design for this console
that looks like the picture in figure 6. Alice transfers her to-
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ken to the address of her preferred candidate. This vote can
be authenticated as a valid vote on arrival by checking the
validity of the attached digital signatures, if the token has a
signature from the Authentication Server, the token can be
accepted. Alice can confirm that her vote has been counted
by checking if her vote has been added to the blockchain.
To send the token to her candidate, Alice uses her private
key to sign a message with the information about the transaction including information about the source of the voting
token, and information about the destination address. The
vote is then broadcast to the peer-to-peer network, where
consensus among the chain can be confirmed. The vote will
then be added to the chain permanently, where it can be
refereed back to should the need arise.

4.4 Post-Voting Phase
The post-voting phase involves the counting of votes, and
also addresses concerns such as recounts, and the audit of
votes.

4.4.1 Counting Votes
After the end of the voting-phase, the cast votes may be
counted by taking the sum of the tokens received by each
candidate/party. The counting process sums only the transactions which are deemed valid by two major criteria. The
first of these being that the transaction originates from an
authorized voter and the same transaction moves immediately to and ends at the address of a validly nominated
candidate. The relevant information to make this check is
stored in detail within the blockchain. Specifically, only legitimately received tokens will be counted(section 4.1).
Because the blockchain keeps permanent record of the
source addresses for all confirmed votes, this can be used to
confirm that only one vote per authorized voter is counted,
if more than one vote originates from the same public key
address, only the first valid vote will be counted.

5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
5.1 Voting System Requirements
The potential success for this voting system can be evaluated by observing the requirements for a successful voting
system, and analyzing how and if these basic needs were met
by the protocol described above.
To maintain uniqueness, voters are restricted to voting
only once because double spending is not a possibility with
the blockchain technology used by Bitcoin. This system also
maintains voter anonymity, by completely separating the
Token Distribution Service and the Authorization Service,
the anonymity of each vote can be safely ensured. Further-
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more, it is important that only those who have legally registered voters take place in the voting process. This requirement is also filled through the pre-voting phase as described
above (section 4.1). Beyond these security measures, it is
important that the voting system is verifiable (section 2).
This system meets this requirement by ensuring that votes
are not just accurately countable once, but are accurately
able to be recounted, and audited with reasonable ease. This
is achieved in the implementation described through the permanent storage of the blockchain. A vote ‘transaction’ is
stored permanently, and the hash of the last block of an
election may serve as evidence should the question of tampering come up. The fact that every node contains a copy
of the blockchain also means that recounts and audits can
be verified with strong consensus.

[4] G. Bleumer. Blind Signature. Springer US, Boston,
MA, 2011.
[5] A.-M. Oostveen and P. V. d. Besselaar. The academic
debate on electronic voting in a socio-political context.
Oct 2019.
[6] B. P. Sloane Brakeville. Blockchain basics: Introduction
to distributed ledgers. June 2018.
[7] K. Stewart. Online voting: The solution to declining
political engagement?, Mar 2018.
[8] VerifiedVoting. Polling place equitment—
VerifiedVoting, 2020. [Online; accessed
17-Feburary-2020; https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier].

6. CONCLUSION
Electronic voting, and specifically internet voting systems
are facing a lot of opposition from experts in the field. The
Verified Voting Foundation, a foundation that works to equip
election officials with the tools they need to validate election
results, and also helps to move states towards the best election security practices. The Verified Voting website (verifiedvoting.org) includes an entire page warning about the
dangers they see in internet voting. They express concerns
about the ability of foreign state actors who may want to
meddle with the results of an election. Their main concern is
the lack of a voter-verified paper record. Their other main
concern relates to the lack of privacy for voters. Because
these things are not offered in any currently offered or implemented electronic voting system, voting with hand-marked
paper ballots is the safest and most secure system.
A system such as the one described above has not yet
been implemented on a large scale, but there are a number
of countries that have tried to implement different forms of
electronic voting. Africa in particular, conducted a substantial amount of social sciences research as it relates to electronic voting. The research revealed some similar concerns
to those described above from the Verified Voting Foundation. One of the major concerns for remote electronic voting
that emerged in this study was the increase in concern for
vote-buying and coercion, two things that voting in person
on a hand-marked ballot can effectively prevent. These are
concerns that were not described in this paper and are concerns that would need to be addressed before the system
could be implemented [5].
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